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Introduction and summary
What determines the number of banks operating in a
market? What is the relationship between the number
of banks in a market and competitive conduct? These
are important questions, whose answers define the
industrial organization characteristics of a banking
market. They are also questions of fundamental poli-
cy relevance for antitrust regulation.
In this article, I address these questions by focus-
ing specifically on very highly concentrated banking
markets. I focus on these markets because this is where
we would expect to observe the least competitive con-
ditions. Indeed, if there is any likelihood of establish-
ing and maintaining a cartel, where firms explicitly
or tacitly collude in order to behave as one monopo-
list, it will be in markets with the fewest firms. It is
in these markets, therefore, that firms should be able
to impose the highest mark-ups; and, by definition,
these markets should raise special antitrust concerns
in the event of a merger application. How anticom-
petitive are highly concentrated banking markets? Is
there any evidence of actual collusive behavior? Also,
how quickly do markets approach a competitive bench-
mark, that is, how many additional entrants does it
take before we observe higher degrees of competition?
Answers to these questions contribute to the policy
debate on competitive conditions in the banking indus-
try and provide information on the current practice for
assessing market competition in merger analysis. As
is widely known, the procedures to evaluate the com-
petitive impact of merger proposals require an evalu-
ation of the concentration of deposit market shares held
by banks operating in the market affected by the merger.
According to the so-called structure–conduct–perfor-
mance paradigm (Bain, 1951), one would expect to ob-
serve increasingly anticompetitive conduct where market
shares are more concentrated. Market concentration
is commonly measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), which is defined as the sum of the squared
market shares of all banks in the market. The HHI in-
dex is bounded from below at zero in the (hypothetical)
case of a very large number of extremely small banks
and bounded from above in the other extreme case of
a monopolist, where the index would then be equal to
1002 = 10,000. According to the current guidelines for
antitrust analysis in banking, if a merger brings a mar-
ket HHI above the value of 1,800, it has the potential
for anticompetitive consequences, thus triggering fur-
ther analysis before approval. In other words, any market
with an HHI above 1,800 is considered highly concen-
trated and, therefore, more likely to be characterized
by anticompetitive conduct. To have a better idea of
how an HHI around 1,800 translates in reality, consider
that a market with five banks, each controlling an equal
share of the deposits market, has an HHI equal to 202
+ 202 + 202 + 202 + 202 = 2,000. As I show below, the
average HHI across all the markets I analyze in this ar-
ticle is about 4,000, and 90 percent have an HHI greater
than 1,800. Hence, the focus of this article is exactly
on the markets that raise special antitrust concerns.
How can we evaluate competitive conduct in such
highly concentrated markets? What we would like to
measure is what Sutton (1992) defines as the tough-
ness of price competition, that is, by how much market
prices vary as the number of competing firms increases.
If it is really the case that incumbent firms collude
and maximize joint monopoly profits, then the entry
of an additional firm would not have any effect on
prices. This extreme model features the least intense19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
level of competition (really the lack thereof) and thus
represents a good benchmark against which to compare
actual market behavior. Any other model of competi-
tion will typically assume some price response by in-
cumbents to the decision of an additional firm to enter
the market. The general prediction of such models is
that prices gradually decrease from the monopoly level
as the number of firms increases, converging—at higher
or slower speed—to marginal cost, the level predicted
by the model of perfect competition.
The question then is: How quickly do prices drop
from the monopoly level? Figure 1 depicts alternative
paths for the price level as a function of the number
of firms in the market for different competitive models.
According to what I illustrated above, the joint monopoly
model does not predict any change in prices as N in-
creases. The other two paths (C1 and C2), from top to
bottom, are for two alternative models with increasing
intensity of competition.
Ideally, we would like to be able to estimate the
empirical relationship between price and the number
of firms. However, doing so requires accurate infor-
mation on price and cost variables, information that is
typically unavailable, especially at the required level
of disaggregation (that is, focusing on local markets).
The methodology I adopt here, proposed by Bresnahan
and Reiss in a series of papers (1987, 1990, 1991),
exploits the fact that there is a close association be-
tween the “price to number of firms” relationship (un-
observable) and the relationship between the number
of firms and the corresponding minimum market size
needed to accommodate one firm, two firms, three firms,
and so on. These levels of market size are defined as
entry thresholds.1
In the following sections, I show that
one can estimate entry thresholds and,
therefore, that one can observe the rela-
tionship between the number of firms in
a market and the entry thresholds. By an-
alyzing this relationship, one can infer the
characteristics of the relationship between
the number of firms and the price. Esti-
mating entry thresholds for a cross-sec-
tion of U.S. local banking markets, I find
no evidence consistent with collusive be-
havior leading to maximization of joint
monopoly profits, even in those markets
with only two or three banks in operation.
Instead, the evidence shows substantial
increases in the intensity of competition
as markets see the entry of a third or fourth
bank and gradual convergence toward more
competitive behavior as more banks enter.
Description of the methodology
The following graphical illustrations are helpful
in clarifying the concept of market-size entry threshold,
its relationship with the number of competing firms,
and how this relationship varies according to the un-
derlying competitive behavior of market participants.
Consider an economy with identical firms facing
the same cost structure and producing the same ho-
mogeneous good. Figure 2, panel A depicts the average
cost function, AC, and the marginal cost function,
MC, of a prospective entrant in a market with N – 1
firms already in operation. The downward sloping
lines D1 and D2 represent alternative levels of residual
demand, that is, the demand schedule that the entrant
would face given the price–quantity decisions of the
N – 1 incumbents (or, in other words, total market
demand minus the total quantity produced by the in-
cumbents). Assume that the existing firms maximize
joint monopoly profits and that they would continue to
do so after the Nth firm enters. I denote the equilibri-
um monopoly price as p = pm. At that price, if the resid-
ual demand schedule is D1, the Nth firm could not
enter and survive in the long run, since it would not be
able to cover average costs (even though it could be
making a handsome price–cost margin, as depicted
by the vertical difference between price and the mar-
ginal cost function at q = q1). However, at price p = pm
and residual demand schedule D2, the firm could en-
ter, produce qm, and break even. Hence, given incum-
bent competitive behavior, if there is a sufficient per
firm market size, expressed in terms of number of
consumers generating a level of demand equal to qm,
then the Nth firm is able to enter the market and join
FIGURE 1
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the monopoly agreement. Such a minimum level of
per firm market size, conditional on joint monopoly
behavior, defines the entry threshold for the Nth firm,
which we denote as sN(m) (where m indicates that
this is the per firm entry threshold under joint mo-
nopoly behavior).
Consider now the opposite extreme scenario, where
the Nth firm would face the most intense competitive
response from the N – 1 incumbents. Figure 2, panel
B describes the cost functions of the Nth prospective
entrant, its residual demand schedule, and the market
price p = ppc. This price, equal to the minimum of the
average cost function, is the lowest possible that can be























in the long run. This is the level of price
predicted by the model of perfect compe-
tition. If the residual demand schedule is
D2, at price ppc the firm could not meet
the long-run profitability condition. The
firm could enter only if residual demand
were high enough so that it could produce
at least a quantity q = qpc. As in the pre-
vious case, a corresponding per firm mar-
ket-size entry threshold conditional on
perfectly competitive behavior and de-
noted as sN(pc) generates the required
quantity level.
As one can see from the two graphs,
for a given number of market incumbents
and a given cost structure, sN (pc) > sN (m).
This is no accident; it shows that a more in-
tense level of competition necessarily cor-
responds to a larger per firm entry threshold.
This observation is fundamental to learn-
ing how to draw an inference from the en-
try threshold–number of firms relationship
to the price–number of firms relationship.
To explore this correspondence fur-
ther, I use a model characterized by an
“intermediate” degree of competitive be-
havior, the well-known Cournot model.
Under Cournot behavior, prospective en-
trants know that incumbents will not mod-
ify their production levels as a consequence
of their entry into the market. Hence, giv-
en a downward sloping market demand
function, the post-entry equilibrium price
will necessarily be lower than it was ex
ante. Because prices fall as N increases,
the Cournot model also predicts that prof-
itability is decreasing in the number of
competing firms. But if profitability is de-
creasing in N, it follows that each consecu-
tive entrant will require an increasingly larger entry
threshold in order to enter and survive in the long run.
For example, consider the case where identical
firms have cost function C = cqn + F, where cqn is
variable cost and F is a fixed cost component (start-
up costs plus additional costs unrelated to the scale
of production). Firms face a linear (inverse) demand
function, q(p) = (a – bp) S, where q is total output,
(a – bp) is the demand of a representative consumer,
and S is the total number of consumers.2 Under Cournot
behavior, each firm chooses the optimal level of pro-
duction in order to maximize profitability, that is,
() .
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It can be easily shown3 that equilibri-










π= −  + 
As one can see, firms’ profitability de-
creases in N. Therefore, for an “intermedi-
ate” model of competition, such as Cournot,
the “price to number of firms” relationship
follows a decreasing path, such as either
C1 or C2 in figure 1. Equation 1 also indi-
cates that, for a given N, profits are in-
creasing in total market size, S.
At what point could the Nth firm en-
ter? As stated above, entry is possible so
long as the residual demand for the Nth
firm is large enough for revenues to cover
average cost. I can express this formally
by saying that entry is granted if the fol-













where pn is the resulting market price
after entry of the Nth firm, (a – bpN)
S
N
is the quantity produced by firm N, and
S
N  is the per firm market size.
Solving equation 2 in 
S
N with an
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where VPN  denotes per customer variable profits.
Thus, the per firm entry threshold needs to be
larger if fixed costs are higher or if variable profit-
ability is lower.
With this last piece of information, I am ready to
establish my basic prediction regarding the relationship
between entry thresholds and number of firms and in
particular how this relationship varies as a function
of the intensity of market competition. First, in the
benchmark case of joint monopoly behavior, prices
do not change with the entry of additional firms.
Assuming that each firm has identical cost structure,
it follows that under joint monopoly behavior variable
profitability does not vary with entry. From equation 3,
we see that so long as each firm faces the same cost
function, under joint monopoly behavior per firm en-
try thresholds will be constant in the number of com-
peting firms, that is,
s1 = s2 = s3 = s4 =  !.
For example, suppose that it takes s1 = 2,000 con-
sumers for the first firm to enter. Under joint monopo-
ly behavior, the second firm will require an additional
FIGURE 3
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2,000 customers before it can enter, and the same
holds true for each additional firm.
Still observing equation 3, under Cournot behav-
ior, because profitability decreases in N, per firm size
thresholds will actually increase in N. In addition, re-
call that as N grows unbounded, the Cournot equilib-
rium converges to perfect competition. But from our
previous graphical illustration, under perfect compet-
itive conditions the per firm entry threshold is equal
to spc. Therefore, under Cournot:
lim , Np c N ss
→∞ =
and consequently,
s1 < s2 < s3 ! < spc.
Figure 3 describes the predicted path of sN as a
function of N for alternative models of competition
(panel B) and the direct correspondence with the “price
to number of firms” relationship (panel A). Under
Cournot, the path is increasing in N, but it converges
to its upper bound spc. Actual market behavior may
show more or less intensity of competition than Cournot;
therefore, an actual path for sN may lie above that for
the Cournot economy or below it. The goal of this ar-
ticle is to estimate the empirical path for consecutive
per firm threshold ratios and infer changes in com-
petitive “toughness” as N increases.
Data and estimation details
The methodology adopted in this paper allows me
to estimate consecutive entry thresholds in local bank-
ing markets using a very parsimonious dataset, allow-
ing me to infer the intensity of competition facing
new market entrants.
My empirical analysis is based on a
cross-section of local U.S. markets, defined
as rural counties. Rural counties and met-
ropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) are
typically considered reasonable approxi-
mations of local banking markets.4 How-
ever, I exclude MSAs from the analysis
because this methodology may not be ap-
propriate for markets of relatively large
size (see Campbell and Hopenhayn, 2002).5
I collected information for the year
1999 on the number of banks, both com-
mercial banks and savings institutions,
competing in each U.S. county, from the
Summary of Deposits database and
matched it with county-level demographic
variables from the Regional Economic
Information System (REIS) dataset of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. The Summary of Deposits dataset
has information through 2001, but the REIS dataset
only goes up to 1999. By focusing on a recent year,
I have access to a cross-section of markets that have
become more and more harmonized in terms of the
regulatory playing field. Both intrastate and interstate
restrictions to branching and to the creation of de novo
banks existed to differing degrees in all U.S. states in
previous decades. However, the relaxation of these
restrictions, culminating in 1994 with the passage of
the Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act, has led to greater homogeneity of local
banking markets across state borders. Hence, one should
find more uniform entry conditions for the sample
of markets in 1999 and need not be concerned with
cross-state differences in the intensity of regulatory
entry barriers.
I analyze the likelihood that there is only one bank
in a market, two banks, three, four, five, and six or
more. The dataset includes 2,257 rural counties. Table 1
illustrates the frequency of bank monopolies, duopo-
lies, and other oligopolies across the total number of
counties. In 1999, there were 147 markets with only
one banking institution, 281 duopolies, 339 markets
with three banks, 313 with four banks, 267 with five
banks, and the residual 910 markets with six or more
banks. The rural counties with the largest number of
banking institutions were La Salle, Illinois, and Dodge,
Wisconsin, with 23 banks each.
My emphasis here is on the number of banking
institutions that have a presence in a market and not
on the total number of bank offices that may be lo-
cated in a certain market. Certainly the same institu-
tion may have multiple branches located in the same
market, but my underlying assumption is that within
TABLE 1
Number of banks, markets, and average market size
Number Number of Cumulative Average
of banks markets Frequency percentage market size
1 147 6.51 6.51 3,879
2 281 12.45 18.96 8,656
3 339 15.02 33.98 12,139
4 313 13.87 47.85 16,980
5 267 11.83 59.68 21,713
6+ 910 40.31 100 26,429
Notes: Number of banks is the sum of commercial and savings banks in
a market. Markets are defined as rural U.S. counties. Average market size
is the average population across markets with the same number of banks.
Data are for 1999.23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
the same local market, branches follow
a homogeneous strategy vis-à-vis other
competitors. Moreover, treating individu-
al branches as independent competitors
and estimating conditions of entry would
imply that the decision to add an addi-
tional branch in a market would be based
on competitive considerations against a
bank’s existing offices, which seems
rather implausible.
As pointed out in the introduction,
the average HHI across the markets un-
der analysis is about 4,000; 90 percent of
the markets have an HHI above 1,800,
the level that, if reached as a consequence
of a merger, would trigger special scruti-
ny by antitrust authorities. Hence, my
presumption is that if there is any evidence of collu-
sive behavior in banking, this is the sample of mar-
kets where it is most likely to show up.
Empirical results
The details of the methodology and the econo-
metric analysis are reported in the appendix. In this
section, I focus directly on the end product, that is,
the estimated entry thresholds reported in table 2.
The results rule out the extreme model of collu-
sion leading to joint monopoly profit maximization.
As the estimates indicate, the per bank entry thresholds
display a clearly increasing path (see also figure 4).
The results are consistent with the predictions of in-
termediate oligopolistic behavior, where the intensity
of competition is sufficiently strong that the entry of
each consecutive bank requires significant increases
in per bank market size to achieve long-run profitabili-
ty. More precisely, the entry of a third bank requires
the per bank threshold to be about 78 percent higher
than that needed in two-bank markets (I obtain this
by computing the ratio s3/s2). Furthermore, the entry
threshold for a fourth bank needs to be an additional
45 percent higher than that for three-bank markets (com-
puted as s4/s3). As reported in the last column in table 2,
these consecutive per firm entry threshold ratios indi-
cate substantial changes in competitive conduct going
from duopolistic market structures to markets with
five or six banks. Indeed, the estimates suggest that
the per bank entry threshold needed to accommodate
a sixth bank is about four times as large as that need-
ed for a duopolist (s6/s2, not reported in the table).
However, the results also suggest that much more
of the action, in terms of competitive changes, occurs
with the entry of a third or fourth bank than with
the entry of a fifth or sixth bank (s3/s2 and s4/s3 are
substantially larger than s5/s4 and s6/s5). This observation
may actually reinforce the justification for setting the
HHI threshold level at 1,800 for antitrust regulation:
Recall that this number approximately refers to a mar-
ket with five banks (each one with equal market share).
These results suggest that, in fact, with five, six, or
more banks, there is not much change in terms of
competitive conditions; this implies that there may not
be a need for regulatory action in those markets in the
case of a merger request.
Conclusion
This article analyzes the conditions of entry and
the competitive conduct in a cross-section of highly
concentrated U.S. banking markets. The empirical
TABLE 2
Estimated entry thresholds
Entry Per bank entry Per firm entry
thresholds thresholds threshold ratios
(000s) (000s)
S2 2.170 S2/2 1.085
S3 5.782 S3/3 1.927 s3/s2 1.776205
S4 11.211 S4/4 2.803 s4/s3 1.454294
S5 17.091 S5/5 3.418 s5/s4 1.219625
S6 23.825 S6/6 3.971 s6/s5 1.161692
Notes: Entry thresholds are obtained using formula 8 in the appendix. SN
denotes the minimum total market size necessary to accommodate N banks.
sN = SN/N is the per bank entry threshold. Figures are obtained using the
maximum likelihood estimated coefficients from table A2 and the sample mean
values of the regressors.
FIGURE 4
Estimated entry thresholds vs. those implied
by joint monopoly behavior











0  1 2 3 4 5 6 724 4Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
APPENDIX: ESTIMATION OF THE ENTRY THRESHOLDS
The only industry information I need using the method-
ology proposed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987, 1990, 1991)
is the number of banks operating in each market. Suppose
we observe that a market has only two banks in operation.
Then they must both be profitable (or in any case the
long-run profitability condition for entry for each one
of them was met), but a third bank entering the market
would have negative profits. More generally, if we ob-
serve N banks in a market, we assume their profitability
but not that of a potential N + 1st entrant.
Consequently, I can estimate the likelihood that a
market had one bank, two banks, three banks, and so on
as a function of a set of variables that should affect bank
profitability. This observation suggests the use of a qual-
itative response model, where the dependent variable is
the number of banks operating in each market (that is, it
takes values 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, where 6 actually clusters
all markets with six or more banks). The function to es-
timate is a profit function similar to equation 2, written
in a more general form as
4) ΠΝ  = SΝ  VN (X, α, β) – FN (W, δ, γ) + ε = 0,
where VN(X, α, β) is per customer variable profits for
the Nth bank, and FN(W, δ, γ) is fixed costs. X and W
are vectors of market-specific variables affecting vari-
able profits and costs, α, β, δ, and γ are profit function
parameters to be estimated, and ε is an error term.
Market size, SN, is proxied by county total popula-
tion. Figure A1 shows a scatter plot of market popula-
tion size and the corresponding number of banks in
operation. As expected, we see a positive relationship
between market population and number of banks in the
market. Indeed, the simple correlation between the two
variables is 0.69.
As proxies of demand conditions, I have included the
levels of farm income per capita, nonfarm income per
capita, and the employment rate. Since markets are rep-
resented by rural counties, I have included both farm
and nonfarm income per capita as proxies of demand
conditions. The prior is that markets with higher per
capita income levels should be indicators of more pros-
perous local economies, which should be reflected in higher
demand for banking products; this, in turn, enhances the
likelihood of bank entry (for given market size). Similarly,
I have also included the county employment rate as an
indicator of overall economic activity, which should have
the same prediction on the likelihood of entry of the in-
come variables. In order to take into account cost charac-
teristics, I have included a measure of the going wage rate
in each county and a measure of land value in the state
as indicators of input costs that a potential entrant would
face in a particular market. My prediction is that the like-
lihood of bank entry should be lower in markets exhib-
iting higher wage rates or land value. Table A1 (on page 26)
reports summary statistics for the main variables.
I model firms’ variable profits as a linear function of
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1The basic intuition behind this methodology can also be found in
Sutton (1992), pp. 27–37.
2Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) use a demand function with such
characteristics.
3See, for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995),
pp. 387–407.
4There is a broad list of empirical studies using MSAs and rural
counties to define the geographical boundaries of banking markets.
NOTES
Rural counties can be defined as integrated local markets with re-
spective county seats acting as focal points of economic activity.
Metropolitan areas are defined as large population nuclei, with
adjacent communities having a high degree of social and economic
integration with the core. Metropolitan areas comprise one or
more entire counties, except in New England, where cities and
towns are the basic geographic units.
5The median MSA has a population of about 900,000, while the
median rural county has a population of about 16,000.
results show, first of all, no evidence consistent with
collusive behavior. Indeed, duopolist markets seem
already sufficiently competitive. The continuous in-
crease in per bank entry thresholds as additional banks
access markets provides further evidence that entry,
or the threat of it, improves market competition. By the
time a sixth bank has entered, the per bank entry thresh-
old is about two and a half times as high as that needed
to accommodate a duopolist. My results, therefore,
suggest that U.S. local banking markets have tended to
approach fairly high competitive levels rather quickly in
recent years, as the number of competing banks has
increased. Presumably, by eliminating important bar-
riers to entry, the process of deregulation in banking
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FIGURE A1
In particular, this expression allows for variable prof-
itability to progressively decrease in the number of firms
operating in the market. More precisely, the variable prof-
its for a monopolist would be V1 = α1 + Xβ; in the case
of a duopolist market it would be V2 = α1 + Xβ – α2; in a
three-firm market, V3 = α1 + Xβ – α2 – α3, and so on.
The decrease in variable profitability could be the result
of increased competition or lower efficiency of the sub-
sequent entrants.
I also assume fixed costs are a linear function of the
number of firms and of market variables and allow them
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so that, F1 = γ1 + Wδ, FN = γ1 + Wδ + γ2, FN = γ1 + Wδ +
γ2 + δ3, and so on. The increase in fixed costs captures the
possible presence of barriers to entry for an additional firm.
Assuming that the error term in equation 4 has a
normal distribution, the likelihood to observe N banks
in a market is estimated through an ordered probit model,
where, as noted earlier, the categorical dependent vari-
able is the number of banks reported in operation in each
market, and the corresponding probabilities for each catego-
ry are estimated maximizing a likelihood function whose
arguments are those of the profit function in equation 4.
Note that estimating the probability of observing mar-
kets with only one bank in operation would require the
observation of markets with no banks. Given our defi-
nition of local markets, there are no rural counties with
a count of zero banks in them. Consequently, the first en-
try threshold that I can actually estimate is that for a
second entrant.
With this consideration in mind, and using equations
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TABLE A2
Estimation of the maximum likelihood function
Regressor Coefficient Standard error Z-value p > Z-value
Nonfarm income 0.00131 0.00048 2.740 0.006
Farm income 0.00730 0.00155 4.700 0.000
Employment rate 0.00019 0.00002 12.330 0.000
Wage rate –56.27922 7.05996 –7.970 0.000
Land value –0.00011 0.00006 –1.950 0.051
α2 0.13115 0.01824 7.190 0.000
γ2 –0.38973 0.12557 3.100 0.002
α3 –0.11398 0.01711 6.660 0.000
γ3 –0.28753 0.09289 3.100 0.002
α4 –0.03500 0.00649 5.390 0.000
γ4 –0.41147 0.06537 6.290 0.000
α5 –0.02126 0.00384 5.530 0.000
γ5 –0.30051 0.05483 5.480 0.000
α6 –0.01589 0.00295 5.380 0.000
γ6 –0.23454 0.05351 4.380 0.000
Observations 2,231
Notes: This table reports the coefficient estimates of the profit function (equation 7). The model is an ordered probit, where
the dependent variable takes values, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, for the number of banks in each cluster of markets. The last cluster groups
markets with six or more banks. A p value below 0.05 expresses statistical significance at the 5 percent level or higher.
The subscripts for the αs and the γs indicate that the first
coefficients to estimate, and the first threshold to calcu-
late, are those for duopolist markets. In view of equation 5,
we expect α2 to be positive, αi, (i = 3, ..., 6) to be nega-
tive, and the βs to be positive. In view of equation 6, we
expect the γs and δs to be negative (there is a negative sign
outside the second bracket in equation 7). Also, following
Bresnahan and Reiss, since we allow for constant terms
in the  N V function, the coefficient for market population
is set equal to one. This is a normalization that expresses
units of market demand into units of market population.
Table A2 shows the estimation results for the or-
dered probit regression model. As the table indicates,
all the variables display the expected effect on the prob-
ability of bank entry. Entry is more likely in markets
with higher levels of both farm and nonfarm income
per capita and with higher employment rates, as denot-
ed by the positive and significant coefficients of both
income variables and the employment variable. Accord-
ingly, entry is less likely in markets characterized by
higher input costs, as indicated by the negative and sig-
nificant coefficients for the two cost variables. Also, as
expected, the variable profitability of each subsequent
entrant is estimated to be progressively declining (the
a i,  i = (3, ..., 6) are negative and significant). At the
same time, additional entry is also associated with
TABLE A1
Demographic variables
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Population 2,257 24.03209 22.9808 0.412 182.399
Nonfarm income 2,257 19.82249 3.854842 8.15167 65.64529
Farm income 2,231 0.870377 1.981094 –7.85946 30.1501
Employment rate 2,257 0.526713 0.151423 0.145826 2.487055
Wage rate 2,257 15.91700 4.486300 4.215000 59.87400
Land value 2,257 933.6611 540.5683 159 6,304
Notes: County population is in thousands. County nonfarm and farm personal income, in thousands of dollars, indicates income levels from
nonfarm and farm activities per total county population, respectively. The employment rate is the ratio of total employment and total population
in a county. The wage rate is the ratio of total wages, in thousands of dollars, and total employment in a county. Land value is an average
across each state. All data are for 1999.
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increasingly higher fixed costs (the  γ
" coefficients are
also negative and significant).
Once the ordered probit model is estimated, I cal-
culate the entry thresholds using the following formula,

















γ +δ + γ
=





where the circumflex indicates the maximum likelihood
estimated coefficients and the upper bar indicates the
sample mean values of the regressors in the ordered
probit model.
So, for instance, using the actual numbers from the
regression results in table A2, the entry threshold for





















γ+ δ + γ
==
α+ β − α
" " "
" ""  S3/3 = 1,927, and so on.
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